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THE LAW OF LABOR AND TRADE.*
"The right to labor is a necessary consequence of the right to live"
and "the freedom of contract is inviolable."
I construe the law, gentlemen, requiring your President to
address you "with particular reference to any statutory
changes in the state of public interest and any needed
changes suggested by judicial decisions during the year" as
meaning in its broadest interpretation that it is your wish to
have submitted for your consideration, the most important
and farthest reaching changes, or proposed changes in juris-
prudence not necessarily local in their origin or progress, if so
it be that we need the benefits of, or should be protected
against the dangers in legislation of other states, springing
from a great tendency or movement affecting or likely to
affect us.
Without, therefore, attempting by preliminary remarks to
persuade you of the aptness of a discussion of the law of labor
and trade at this particular time, it is my purpose to touch
upon the history of legislation relating to these subjects, but
more especially to bring to your attention some specimens of
recent enactments affecting them, that they may be examined
* Address by P. C. Knox, Esq., President, to the members of the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association.
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in the light of -the underlying principles of our government,
and the economic laws they are designed to control.
Now that the defense of life and individual freedom is no
longer the chief care of civilized men, it may be said that
among the main purposes of all existing social compacts are
the production, preservation and distribution of wealth. This
is true whether the organization be a commune or the more
common form of social agreement where the individual is
permitted to work out his own ends according to his bwn
capacity and fancy.
The right to labor for the production of property is un-
questioned. It has been well said to be "a necessary conse-
quence of the right to live." This right is the same whether
the purpose be to produce or acquire only sufficient for main-
tenance or to accumulate a surplus beyond the individual's
needs.
The right to the property thus acquired is protected in all
governments to the acquisitor and to those to whom he may
convey or transmit it by sale, gift or devise. This right was
the first concession by tyranny to progressing humanity and
was only yielded after a struggle of centuries. The right to
acquire property and to possess it are, therefore, the same in
their nature, and are both included by economists under the
general term " Right of property." It is thus expressed by
Say in his work on Political Economy, Sec. 133 : "The right
.of property is equally invaded by obstructing the free employ-
ment of the means of production as by violently depriving the
proprietor of the product."
A means of acquiring property or wealth besides labor is
by exchange or sale. These rights are equally fundamental,
and are included in the right of property as above defined.
Such transactions in property are effected through contracts
between individuals, and contracts, which are the expression
,of the terms upon which individuals deal with property or
the means of producing it, have, in all forms of government,
been the subjects of the greatest consideration. "The liberty
,of contract is one of the inalienable rights of the citizen."
These regulative social and economic principles find ex-
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pression in one form or another, or are recognized in all
constitutional governments. They are all included in the
Declaration of Rights in the words, "All men are born equal,
free and independent and have certain inherent and inde-
feasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and de-
fending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and pro-
tecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own
happiness."
The rights to acquire, possess and protect property are
inherent and indefeasible. As there is no difference be-
tween the nature of the right to acquire and the right to
possess property, so there is no degree ofpreference expressed
for the one right above the other in this great declaration of
their nature and legal status. Neither is there any distinction
or preference shown as between the means of acquisition,
whether by physical, mental or commercial activities.
We approach, therefore, the legislation affecting the rights
to acquire, possess and protect property, with the certainty
that by the fundamental law they are inherent and indefeasible
in all men. "This equality of right," said Mr. Justice Field,
"with exemption of all disparaging and partial enactments, in
the lawful pursuits of life throughout the whole country, is
the distinguishing privilege of the citizens of the United
States." The Constitution of the United States provides
that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States," and further that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
Legislation affecting the right to acquire property began
early in the English speaking world. It was at some periods
aimed at and undertook to regulate its acquisition by labor,
through statutes affecting labor; at other times at its acquisi-
tion through trade, by statutes regulating trade and com-
merce. At times these laws bore harshly and unjustly upon
the one, again upon the other.
The world has seen four great epochs in labor.
First, the struggle for individual emancipation from serf-
dom and slavery.
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Next, the period of the guilds or monopolies of labor,
whose unique and far reaching oppressions made the demand
of the masses of Europe for free labor a potent factor in the
readjustment of governmental and social conditions during
the past two centuries. Labor is entitled to the credit of its
own original emancipation, and to the odium of its self-
imposed tyranny existing in the two periods suggested.
Again, we have the period of statutory oppression, followe
by the existing era of legislative favor.
From slavery labor became a tyrant; thence it sank into
oppression, again to rise to its present status.
The first Act of Parliament known as the Statute of Laborers
is the Statute of 23 Edward III. By its terms every man and
woman under threescore having no occupation was required to
serve in a suitable station for the wages and upon the terms
usual in the preceding five or six years. Severe penalties were
provided for non-compliance. Later, prices were fixed by Par-
liament for a day's work for agricultural labor and certain
artifices. The penalty for abstention from service under this
Act was to be branded with a hot iron upon the forehead with
a letter "F" to denote falsity.
This statutory enslavement of the skilled and unskilled labor
of England in the fourteenth century was followed down to the
present century by penal acts preventing agreements for ad-
vancing wages or lessening the usual hours of work. It was
also highly penal to endeavor by any means to try to prevent
any unemployed person from taking service, or to try to induce
any person to leave his work or to refuse to work with any
other workmen or to assist men upon a strike or to collect
money or attend meetings having any such purpose in view.
Thus, with slight modifications, the law stood until 1824
and 1825, when the Statutes of England were purged of these
harsh and unjust provisions and the course of judicial decision
upon the law of conspiracy was changed by enactments that
in effect legalized all that had theretofore been prohibited
except when accomplished by violence, threats or intimidation,
molestation or obstruction.
The different States of this Union have met and in many
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instances further extended the liberty and privileges of asso-
ciated labor. In Pennsylvania, trades unions may be chartered
to do substantially all that was inhibited by the English Statutes
and by common law as it was expounded in this Common-
wealth, and Congress has provided for the incorporation of
trades unions for many purposes criminal at common law.
In Pennsylvania, the Act of June 14, 1872, provides that it
shall be lawful for any laborer or laborers, acting either as
individuals or as the member of any association, to refuse to
work for any person whenever in his, her or their opinion the
wages paid are insufficient or the treatment of such laborer or
laborers is brutal or offensive, or the continued labor by such
laborer or laborers would be contrary to the rules of any
organization to which he or they might belong, without sub-
jecting any person or persons so refusing to work to prosecu-
tion for conspiracy. To this act there is a provision reserving
liability to prosecution to those who shall in any way hinder
persons who desire to labor or who shall hinder other persons
from being employed as laborers. The Legislature, however,
in 1876, construed this proviso by enacting that the use of
force, threat or menace of harm to persons or property shall
alone be regarded as in any way hindering persons who desire
to labor, or other persons being employed as laborers.
So that as the law now stands in this great industrial State,
and it is by no means an extreme illustration of American
legislative attitude towards labor, a man may work when he
pleases, for whom he pleases and for what he pleases. He
may lawfully refuse for any reason to continue his labor,
whether the reason be one based upon his own grievance or
be predicated upon some rule of an association. He may do
anything he chooses by himself or in conjunction with his
associates to advance the price of labor, to restrict its hours,
to prevent others from working for his employer or to prevent
others from being employed, provided he does not use force,
threat or menace of harm to persons or property, without
being subject to prosecution or indictment for conspiracy under
the criminal laws.
. Thus we see the right to acquire property by labor is free,
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absolutely free. Indeed, more than free, as in addition to the
freedom of the individual the law provides for the association
of numbers and legalizes their co-operation for purposes
formerly illegal. Nay more, in Pennsylvania, in respect to
corporations, which are the great employers of labor, by the
Act of June 4, 1897, it is made a misdemeanor punishable by
fine and imprisonment to coerce by discharging a workman
from service because of his connection with any lawful labor
organization, or to exact from any applicant for employment
any promise not to form, join or belong to such lawful labor
organization, or to attempt by any means whatsoever to inter-
fere with the laborer's free and untrammeled connection there-
with.
The right to trade means the right to contract. The
simplest as well as the most complicated engagements between
men are contractual. The liberty which enables a man to
dispose of his own services upon his own terms is but the
liberty of contract. The right to dispose of one's own surplus
to acquire the surplus of another, or to supply the necessities
or requirements of others, is but the right of contract. Any
restriction placed upon this right is a restriction upon the
liberty of contract, which is an inalienable right, being included
in the right to acquire and possess property.
The right to trade has been at times more or less tram-
meled for the good or supposed good of the public. As in
the case of labor, it was in England subject to many Parlia-
mentary regulations and restrictions.
The attempt to regulate the trade and commerce of England
by artificial rules contained in Acts of Parliament led to many
curious and ridiculous consequences before it was abandoned.
The spirit of commerce could not thus be confined. The
desperate attempts of Parliament to keep the business of the
kingdom within the lines and subject to the regulations imposed
by that authority led from one encroachment to another upon
the freedom of the people and culminated in the sumptuary
regulations enacted in the reign of. Edward III, which pre-
scribed even the dress and diet of his subjects.
As in the case of labor, so in respect to the price of com-
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modities, it was fixed in utter defiance of-the law of supply
and demand or the cost of production. Contracts for the sale
or exchange of goods were forbidden, except at the staples or
market places fixed by law, and there only under imposed
conditions. The system of special privileges soon came into
existence. The more powerful merchants and manufacturers
were enabled to purchase or otherwise secure exemption from
the general rules, and in the end exclusive rights were granted.
Thus monopolies came into existence. The sale of grants of
monopoly was a speedy and certain method of raising revenue
for the crown. Traffic therein soon overleaped the limits of
the necessity for revenue, and was maintained to feed the
avarice of the soverign and his court. The most odious form
of commercial or industrial enterprise is a monopoly. A
monopoly is defined by Lord Coke to be "an institution or
allowance by the King by his grant, commission, or otherwise,
to person or persons, bodies political or corporate, of or for
the sole buying, selling, making, working or using of anything
whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate
are sought to be restrained of any freedom of liberty they had
before, or hindered in their lawful trade:" 7 Bacon's Abridg-
ment, 22.
And by the Supreme Court of the United States as, " the
withdrawing of that which is a common right from the com-
munity and vesting it in one or more individuals, to the
exclusion of all others:" Charles River Bidge Case, i i
Peters, 567.
Monopolies can only exist by grant from the sovereign.
They cannot be created by contract between individuals.
During the period that. the labor guilds and corporations so
effectually destroyed the freedom of labor, monopolies flour-
ished to the destruction of all competing trade. The validity
of monopolistic grants during and prior to the reign of Eliza-
beth was successfully contested in Darcy v. Allen, in 16oi,
and in 1624, Parliament declared them null and void.
Sir John Culpepper said of the monopolies of England,
Like the frogs of Egypt they have gotten possession of our
dwellings, and we have scarce a room free from them.
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They sup in our cup; they dip in our dish; they sit by our
fires. We find them in the dye fat, wash bowl and powder-
ing tub. They share with the butler in his box. They will
not bait us a pin. We may not buy our clothes without
their brokerage. These are the leeches that have sucked
the commonwealth so hard that it is almost hectical."
Detestation of a monopoly is ingrained in the Anglo-Saxon.
"They have always been harlots in the courts, going in at
one door to be cast out at another." They are contrary to.
the spirit of free governments, and have been held to infringe
the rights of the people under the Constitutions of many States.
To this sentiment must be attributed the hostility now so pro-
nounced against many of the great commercial and industrial
enterprises of the country which possess or are alleged to
possess the features of a monopoly, that has found expression
in the legislation of Congress and of many of the States-
The general features of this legislation are substantially the
same. In the main they are acts having in view two purposes:.
i. To make void as against public policy, contracts estab-
lishing monopolies or which may tend to establish them.
2. To make void all contracts which do or may restraint
trade or prevent competition.
Fines and imprisonments are provided for those offending
by being parties to such contracts, and in portions of the land.
of the setting sun other features are embodied expressive of a.
hostility to thrift that takes a form not worthy of serious con-
sideration. As for illustration, the proposed anti-department-
store laws designed to prevent merchants from offering for-
sale more than a limited number of kinds of articles, to the-
utter extinction of the useful and convenient shopkeepers who-
have succeeded their pilgrim prototype who supplied his
customers, according to his alliterative sign-board, with
"TESTAMENTS, TAR AND TREACLE,
GODLY BOOKS AND GInmLETs."
The New York statute may be taken as a type. It con-
tains all of the features of the Act of Congress recently con-
strued by the Supreme Court of the United States, with such.
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additions as bring it fully up to the most radical and advanced
thought upon the subject evidenced in the acts passed or
introduced in nearly all the States, including our own. Its
title and first two sections are as follows:
"AN AcT
"To prevent monopolies in articles or commodities of common
use, and to prohibit restraints of trade and commerce, pro-
viding penalties for violations of the provisions of this act,
and procedure to enable the attorney-general to secure tes-
timony in relation thereto.
"The People of the State of New York, represented in
Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows :-
"Section i. Every contract, agreement, arrangement or
combination whereby a monopoly in the manufacture, pro-
duction, or sale in this state of any article or commodity of
common use is or may be created, established or maintained,
or whereby trade or commerce in this state in any such
article or commodity is or may be restricted, or whereby
competition in this state in the supply or price of any such
article or commodity is or may be restrained or prevented
or whereby for the purpose of creating, establishing or
maintaining a monopoly within this state of the manufacture,
production or sale of any such article or commodity, the
free pursuit of any lawful business, trade or occupation is,
or may be, restricted or prevented, is hereby declared to be
against public policy, illegal and void.
"Sec. 2. Every person or corporation, or any officer or
agent thereof, who shall make or attempt to make or enter
into any such contract, agreement, arrangement or combina-
tion, or who within this state shall do any act pursuant
thereto, or in, towards or for the consummation thereof,
wherever the same may have been made, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and on conviction thereof shall, if a natural
person be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment for not longer than one year,
or by both such fine and imprisonment; and if a corpora-
tion, by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars."
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Contracts creating monopolies and all contracts in restraint
of trade are the targets. Between these there are many
points of resemblance and some of striking and radical differ-
ence. While a valid monopoly always restrains trade, in fact,
annihilates competition, a contract between individuals can
never create a monoply.
Legislation against monopolies, except in so far as it may
be to repeal existing grants, amounts to nothing, as there can
be no pretense of exclusive right to pursue any trade or call-
ing without legislative grant. The sovereign power need not
forbid, it need only refrain from creating to prevent any claim
of monopoly arising. Two or more persons, whether natural
or artificial, combining their labor, skill or capital in the prose-
cution of any work or trade, cannot create a monopoly no
matter what the terms of their combination may be. It is only
in their power to place limitations upon their own acts. They
can neither contract nor expand the rights of others in respect
to a similar business. Statutes, in so far as they make
it a penal offence to make contracts creating monopolies,
undertake to punish an impossible act. The statute quoted
declares illegal and void every contract whereby a monopoly
in the production, manufacture or sale of any article in common
use is or may be created and provides for the punishment, by
fine and imprisonment, of the parties thereto. By what
process any two or more persons in the State of New York,
by contract or combination could create a monopoly, is hard
to understand, if it be true that a monopoly can only be created
by a grant from the sovereign, and "it is the withdrawing of
that which is a common right from the community and vest-
ing it in one or more individuals to the exclusion of all
others," as above defined. Such legislation, so far as it
voids contracts creating monopolies, is meaningless, confusing
and unnecessary.
The interesting, important and serious question raised by
this legislation and the one after all that underlies all such
acts is this, can the legislature forbid and invalidate all con-
tracts which are or may be in restraint of trade, or restrictive
of competition ?
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The liberty of contract which is said to be an inalienable
right and guaranteed to the citizens by authority beyond legis-
lative control is nevertheless subject to certain limitations.
Contracts to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act
in an unlawful way, are criminal and void. Contracts that
are against public policy are prohibited in this sense, that
they cannot be enforced. It is interesting to note that this
is the only sense in which they are prohibited. It was
never supposed that A. and B. could not make any com-
mercial or business agreement they saw fit and carry it out
according to its terms, even though the public would be
benefited by their not doing so. If A. voluntarily, with
or without consideration, agrees with B. not to carry on
a competitive trade, the courts could not compel him to do so
or prevent B., by any process, from conducting his business
under the more favorable conditions thereby secured. If such
a contract were unreasonable, without consideration, or injuri-
ously affected the public, the courts would refuse to enforce
its provisions against one of the non-complying parties upon
the ground of public policy. This would not strictly be an
interference with the liberty of contract between persons sui
jris and dealing with their own, but a refusal by the public
to lend the machinery of the law maintained at the public
expense, to enforce an agreement that affected injuriously the
public interests. This is a sound public policy and it is the
utmost extent to which the liberty of contract has heretofore
been adversely affected. It will be observed the legislation
under discussion is not upon these lines. It is not an attempt
to establish a new public policy for the guidance of the courts
broad enough to deny a remedy to a different class of cases
from that now excluded. It makes the contracts themselves
illegal and void, vests the courts with jurisdiction to restrain
their operation, and punishes the parties. It is the legis-
lators saying, inasmuch as, in our opinion, it would be better
for the public at large that both A. and B. should continue to
prosecute their callings or trades in competition with each
other, although perhaps to their disadvantage, we will force
them to continue to do so by denying them the power to
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negotiate a sale, combination or consolidation upon the only
terms such an arrangement could be made, to wit, by the
vending or absorbed party covenanting to refrain from engag-
ing in a similar employment, and we enforce our will not by
denying them a forum for the enforcement of such a contract,
but by furnishing a prison for the fact of its existence. This
is certainly radical and new.
Is there not a distinction between the power of the legisla-
ture, assuming it to have such power, to declare a contract
void as against public policy, thereby barring the courts from
its enforcement, and legislative power to make the execution
of such a contract a crime?
But does the legislature have power to declare illegal all
contracts in restraint of trade, even to the extent of closing the
courts against them?
No one has yet defined, so far as I have been able to
discover, the term "in restraint of trade " in such a way as to
give to it that certainty essential to a clear understanding of a
written law. There has been little concern heretofore about a
precise definition, as in administrative justice the validity of the
contract has usually turned upon its consideration, its reason-
ableness, the situation of the parties and the interests of the
public. Now, however, in view of these acts declaring all
contracts in restraint of trade criminal and void and the
decision of the highest court in the land that neither reason-
ableness, consideration nor the necessities of the parties are
elements to remove any contract from that classification, it
becomes vital to know exactly what the words, in restraint of
trade, import.
We know of that endless list of contracts that have been
the subjects of contention in the cases in which the prin-
ciples of the application of the rules of public policy to con-
tracts in restraint of trade have been settled. In most, if
not all of these the fact that the agreements were in restraint
of trade was conceded and the validity of the contract con-
tended for, nevertheless, upon one or another of the above
grounds. The Supreme Court of the United States states
the rule of guidance to be this,-when it is claimed that a
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contract in restraint, of trade is void,-" Public welfare is
first considered, and if it be not involved and the restraint
upon one party is not greater than protection to the
other party requires, the contract may be sustained. The
question is whether under the particular circumstances of
the case, and the nature of the particular contract involved
in it, the contract is or is not reasonable :" Gibbs v. Bali-
more Gas Co., 130 U. S. 397. This case does not define a
contract in restraint of trade; it merely tells us when such a
contract is lawful.
Nester v. Brewing Co., 161 Pa. 473, decides that a contract
designed solely to prevent all competition among the parties
in restraint of trade, is against public policy, and will not be
enforced, but this throws no light upon what constitutes re-
straint or what is the meaning of trade.
Assuming the word " restraint" is to be taken in its usual
meaning, what is this trade that is the ward of public policy,
and is to be subjected to no restraint? Is it a fitful hand
to mouth course of dealing subject to no law but sentiment,
in which profits are to be reaped under the protection of arti-
ficial laws of local .application? Or is it a great system of
production, sale, and exchange growing out of the wants and
necessities of humanity and governed by laws as inexorable as
those of nature, and equally incapable of being restrained or
diverted from affecting any country or state? Will it be a de-
fence to an indictment for being a party to a contract in
restraint of trade that in fact the contract does not restrain
trade, although it restricts competition, but upon the con-
trary promotes trade by preserving it where it would other-
wise perish? And is this a question of law or fact, and
upon what kind of evidence is it to be determined? If
American manufacturers are undersold in the markets of
the world by their foreign competitors, does it restrain
trade for them to combine to effect economies beyond their
individual means and to confirm their agreement to act
in unison by covenants in partial restraint of trade, when
not to do so means bankruptcy, idleness, and loss to the com-
munity? If a number of workmen combine to raise their
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wages, secure more reasonable hours, or to correct a real or
fancied abuse, and agree to attain their ends by refusing to
work until they are conceded, are they shielded by the statutes
declaring these purposes to be legal and exempting them from
prosecution in view of a subsequent law making all combina-
tions in restraint of trade criminal? These are all material
questions, as lawyers well know, and laymen are soon to dis-
cover.
-;'Without undertaking to define restraint of trade, I think it
safe to say all those contracts are included in this legislation
as crimes and void which have been treated as in restraint of
trade in the adjudicated cases and have only been saved in the
courts because of the character and extent of the considera-
tion, the necessities of the parties, their reasonableness, under
the particular circumstances or some previous statutory ex-
emption that may now fall by repeal.
It would require the space of a volume to enumerate the
business contracts that have, though concededly in restraint of
trade, been sustained by the courts. Illustrations at once
occur to the professional mind. The case of a sale of a
business and its good will is a common one. Here a covenant
upon the part of the vendor not to engage in competition with
his vendee in a similar business is often the main considera-
tion for the transaction. This is, of course, in restraint of
trade, and interferes with competition. But to make a con-
tract such as this illegal is not only restrictive of the liberty
of contract, but it is depriving one of his property without
due process of law. Good-will is property capable of being
appraised, bought and sold. In many cases and especially
in the lines of business intended to be most affected by
this new legislation, it is the main ingredient of value. It
represents all the struggle, industry, tact and judgment that
makes success. In estimating the worth of a business it is
not infrequently reckoned more valuable than the buildings
and machinery that make up the physical plant.
In the Store Order Cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania says- :
"The legislature cannot prevent persons who are sui juris
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from making their own contracts:" Godcharles & Co. v. Wei-
man, 113 Pa., 431.
In Commonwealth v. Peny, the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts says :
"The right to acquire, possess and protect property includes
the right to make reasonable contracts, which shall he ' under
the protection of the law.'"
That is just what this legislation attempts to prevent. All
contracts, reasonable or unreasonable, upon good considera-
tion or upon none, necessary or unnecessary for the real
interests of the parties, all are alike forbidden if they in any
way or to any extent restrain trade or have that tendency.
The Supreme Court of the United States so construed the Anti-
Trust Act of i89o. The language of the opinion is this:--
"When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal
every contract or combination in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states, etc., the plain and ordinary
meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of con-
tract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all
contracts are included in such language, and no exception or
limitation can be added without placing in the Act that which
has been omitted by Congress:" United States v. Trans-Missouri
Frt. Assn., 17Supreme Ct. Rep. 540 (Mar. 22, 1897). This, of
course, includes combinations among workmen as well, if they
in any way restrain trade. No matter how peaceable, orderly,
just and reasonable the combination may be; no matter what
oppressive injustice or harshness it may be designed to correct.
If it restrains trade (and all such combinations do restrain
trade for without that effect they would be impotent) it is
a crime. This was specifically determined in United States
v. Debs.
If it could be successfully contended in view of the legisla-
tion declaring trades unions lawful and exempting their
members from criminal prosecution for combining in restraint
of trade that they would thereby not be included within the
terms of these new laws, then, when it is remembered that
among the purposes for which labor organizations may exist,
are the advancement of wages, the regulation of the service,
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the shortening of hours, the maintenance of their own rules,
the prevention of others from taking employment by means
other than force, it requires but a moment's consideration to
suggest the sharp contrast between such legislation and that
which renders criminal and void similar co-operation between
the traders and commercial classes of the country. The law
would then be this : A combination that raises the price of
goods is void, and the combiners are punished as criminals
because of a public policy declared by .tatute. A combina-
tion to raise the cost of production of the goods by forcing an
increase in wages or a diminution of service is valid because of
a public policy declared by statute. As the effect upon the
public is the same, to wit, an increase in the price, it is diffi-
cult to discover the underlying reason for the legislative
pronouncement that one is contrary to public policy while
the other is in accord.
Under general language of prohibition upon all contracts
that do or may restrain trade or upon combinations that have
for their purpose or may effect an increase or decrease in the
price of commodities in general use, it will require a fine dis-
crimination to fasten the inhibition upon employers and dis-
cover immunity for the employees because of previous favor-
able legislation. Four Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States concur in this statement. "The interpretation
of the statute (The Anti-Trust Act of I89o) which holds that
reasonable agreements are within its purview, makes it em-
brace every peaceable organization or combination of the
laborer to benefit' his condition, either by obtaining an increase
of wages or diminution of the hours of labor."
A corporation employer in Pennsylvania engaged in inter-
state trade finds himself in this peculiar position: He goes
to prison if he himself enters into a reasonable contract in
restraint of trade. He goes to prison under the Act of 1897
if he induces his employee not to do so. The employee in
turn is thus situated: He may prosecute his employer for
interfering with his connection with a labor organization, and
will himself be prosecuted if he joins one existing for either
of the above laudable purposes. The situation as to domestic
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trade will be the same should the pending Anti-Trust Act
become a law.
There is a well defined policy of the law to omit to classify
as crimes many agreements and combinations that it will not
undertake to enforce. This is found in the decisions of the
courts; also in statutes. While by statute agreements to,
raise or lower the price of wages and to regulate the hours of'
labor are no longer punishable, they are not enforcible at law.
The courts will not undertake to compel contributions for the
maintenance of a strike nor enforce penalties among combina-"
tions of employers who operate or refuse to operate their
workls against the terms of an agreement. Unless every act
of our daily lives is to be regulated by the wisdom of our
law makers, it must necessarily be that we may do or omit to
do many things of which the courts will take no cognizance,
yet for which we may not be punished.
The argument tending to uphold the constitutionality of
an act making an agreement to restrain trade a crime is given
by Lord Esher in his dissenting opinion in the case of the
Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Law Reports, Queen's
Bench Division, page 605, and it is this: "Agreements held
to be illegal because in restraint of trade must have been so
held not because there was any wrong done to the traders
who agreed-for they all agreed what was to be done-but
because there was a wrong to the public. The restraining
themselves from a free course of trade was held to be a
wrong to the public . . . The cases do not determine
whether an agreement which is void as between the par-
ties to it because it is in restraint of trade is or is not an
indictable offense. But if such an agreement is illegal be-
cause it is a wrong to the public, it seems to me inpossible
to say that it is not indictable. An illegal act which is a-
wrong against the public welfare seems to have the neces-
sary elements of a crime."
It might be safely conceded that any act having the neces-
sary elements of a crime is a crime at common law, and may
be defined as such by statute. Also, that an illegal act which.
is a wrong against the public welfare has the necessary ele-
433
THE LAW OF LABOR AND TRADE.
ments of a crime. This means when applied to the topic under
discussion that the legislature might punish as a misdemeanor
the making of that class of contracts in restraint of trade which
the courts would not enforce. It means nothing more.
Many things are done and can be done under the protec-
tion of constitutional guarantees with impunity that affect
specific public interests injuriously. Segregated competition
in business is not a plank in our platform of rights, but the
liberty of contract, included in the right to acquire and possess
property is a main- one. It is not nearly so important to foster
a fanciful system of free trade in a state as to rear a race of
free men. The contract obnoxious to a sound public policy
is now invalid. The innocuous one cannot be made so With-
out infringing the liberty of contract. Legislation that is
anything more than declaratory of a public policy to which
all contracts would otherwise be submissive is in itself in restraint
of trade, against public policy, unconstitutional and void.
The constitution not only secures to the citizen freedom, of
contract, but it also guarantees him a remedy by due course
of law. The remedy is denied him in respect to his contract
only when it contravenes public policy. The courts have
uniformly held the right to make reasonable contracts upon
consideration in partial restraint of trade to be within the
constitutional guarantees and have uniformly enforced them.
The declaration of what is and what is not public policy is
not always or necessarily a legislative function. Congress has
only such legislative power as the people have granted to it,
and limitations are expressly imposed upon the lawmakers of
all States. The rights of life, liberty and property; the rights
of conscience; the right of suffrage; trial by jury; freedom
of the press to examine the proceedings of any branch of the
government; rights of accused; the right to a remedy in the
courts-all these and many others declared in the Bill of
Rights are removed from governmental interference and are
declared to be excepted out of the general powers of govern-
ment and to be forever inviolate. The interpretation of these
written guarantees is a judicial power and duty. The extent
to which a right once conceded to be within this classification
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is or must be limited, for the public good is also necessarily a
judicial function, and therefore it is for the courts alone in the
end to declare the public policy effecting such limitation. The
Legislature can make no rule of interpretation of the Consti-
tution when it relates to rights declared to be excepted out of
its powers.
The legislature may, upon the other hand, in the exercise
of that general power of government known as the police
power, define a public policy upon all matters falling within
its scope. Nothing, however, comes under the police power
that is excepted out of the general powers of government.
The right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property is
so excepted. This includes freedom to contract. This in-
cludes freedom to make reasonable contracts in partial restraint
of trade, so the courts have said, and the question is closed.
The ultimate proposition, therefore, is this : Any privilege
or right declared by the courts to be guaranteed by the Con-
stitution cannot be taken away by the legislature, either by
punishing its exercise as a crime or by denial of a remedy in
respect thereto, or stated in another form, a judicial interpre-
tation of a guarantee cannot be modified by a legislative act.
I have endeavored to show that the mischief created by
contract cannot rise to the evil of a monopoly. At its worst
it cannot go beyond temporary or partial restraint of trade and
interference with competition. It cannot close the field, and
any contract, agreement or combination for that purpose is
void in the sense that it cannot be enforced as the law is now
declared. Further limitation than this upon the freedom of
contract is neither wise nor valid.
If it is true as alleged upon the one hand that there never
was a time when the business of the country was so concen-
trated, it is claimed to be also true upon the other hand that
the public has never been so well and cheaply served. As
there is no hard and fast rule of public policy, it presents a
nice question, either to the legislature which undertakes to
declare a policy by statute, or the courts in the exercise of
their power to determine one, in which direction the true
interests of the public lie.
If we could lawfully adopt by statute the unbending rule
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that if competition is or may be restrained or prevented, the
contract is illegal, thus denying the right of combination among
the weak, how is the great power of individual capital to be
contended with ? What would have been the condition of
labor without the right to combine for lawful purposes?
What is to become of trade if methods cannot be changed to
meet its ever varying laws ?
Combinations of capital are merely the co-operation idea
applied to capital so much and justly extolled in the field of
labor. Those halcyon days wherein the margins of profits
were sufficiently broad to enable all degree of thrift, enterprise
and talent to live in a given trade are gone, not to be restored
by sentiment or legislation. The course of trade is influenced
by the elements, modified by international agreement between
and political and social conditions existing in, the most remote
countries of the world. The value of a bushel of wheat may
depend upon the construction of a railroad in Asia. That of a
ton of iron or coal upon the existence of war or peace in
Europe.
Self-preservation is the first law. It applies to governments
as well as to individuals. In legislation this principle is known
as the police power. In jurisprudence its integrity is preserved
under the guidance of the rules of a sound public policy. So
to use your own as not to injure another's is the essence of
the whole matter, and it practically means to use your own so
as not to prevent another from making a similar use of his if
he cares to do so.
Existing conditions do not present a demand for legislation,
but for the enforcement of well established laws and principles
adequate to correct all infringements of private or public rights.
Combinations, whether of employers or employees, are not
essentially bad or essentially good. It is well nigh impossible
to legislate in reference to them lawfully or wisely. Even the
omnipotent and unrestrained Parliament of England gave up
the task as a hopeless one, and whether it be a consequence
or a coincidence it is nevertheless the fact that the greatest
industrial progress of the world has been accomplished in the
period following the repeal of the laws oppressing labor and
antedating the laws oppressing trade.
